Roskilde University,
Denmark
John
Symons
University of Texas at El Paso, TX, USA
Preface
In the spring of
2005 we had the opportunity to work collaboratively on problems related
to the application of epistemic logic and formal learning to traditional
epistemological questions. Given the nature of this topic, our
conversations regularly turned to the more general question of the
relationship between formal methods and philosophical investigation. We
realized that some of the philosophers we most admire had never
explicitly articulated their views on these questions and it occurred to
us that it might be worth asking them. We decided to pose five
relatively open and broad questions to some of the best philosophers who
make formal methods a centerpiece in their work. This book contains
their responses to our questions.
The book is motivated by our curiosity but also by our discontent.
Neither of us is content with the prominent histories of analytic
philosophy currently on the market and we both believe that the
discussion of general methodology of philosophy is in a pretty poor
state. One of the most significant faults we see with such recent work
is its failure to recognize and tackle the central place of formal
methods. Shopworn narratives about the failures of logical positivism,
the decline of formal methods in philosophy and the rise of
intuitions-based conceptual analysis, are neither entirely true nor
particularly helpful. In any case, such talk has been overwhelmed by
the ongoing buzz of interesting work from philosophers who look much
more like Russell and Carnap than Rorty. We
hope that this project can serve as a counterweight to some of the more
popular surveys of the philosophical landscape. However, our intention
is not to promote the use of formal methods in philosophy. Firstly, it
is not necessary for us to do so. Formal philosophy is thriving without
any advertising. In our view, rather than promoting this kind of work,
we can help to begin a fruitful conversation about the deep and
interesting methodological problems that formal work in philosophy
presents.
Clearly formal methods by themselves are not a panacea for all that
might ail the philosopher, however, it is just as clear that there is
something peculiarly fertile in the interplay between formalism and
philosophical inquiry. Even those who reject analytic traditions in
philosophy recognize that many of the most important developments in
philosophy and its broader intellectual environment have arisen out of
engagement with mathematics, logic, computer science, decision theory,
physics and the other natural sciences. While there are limits to what
formal methods can contribute, formal insights have sharpened,
radicalized and extended philosophical investigation which would never
have seen the light of day without the aid of formal methods.
Of course, it would be foolish to suggest that philosophy is a purely
technical enterprise. Clever manipulations of symbols and formal
apparata by themselves are not enough to solve or to deepen the
understanding of philosophical problems. Philosophers must not only
achieve some result, but must also judge that it is relevant to some
philosophical problem or line of investigation. It must be determined
when the applications of formal methods is appropriate and when
something like common-sense, intuition and conceptual analysis
legitimately come into play. When one encounters cases where scientific
results lead to conclusions that seem to run counter to common-sense,
how does one adjudicate? Are there a general set of principles that
determine when a given problem can be solved using formal methods?
These and related questions arise naturally at the intersection of
formal methods and philosophical investigation.
Many of the philosophers we most admire simply avoid taking sides on
these methodological questions in their written work. Rather than
speaking in broad terms about the nature of the philosophical
enterprise, they simply do philosophy. Rather than worrying over the
ends or the death of philosophy, they are doing wonderful and important
work in philosophy. We will not comment on the details of the responses
we received to our five questions. Each is self-explanatory and
readable and it is not our goal to synthesize one overarching view of
the nature of formal work in philosophy. Our purpose in this project is
not to articulate any specific agenda or definition but rather to begin
to open the discussion of how formal philosophers understand their
enterprise. Part of this project involves understanding why these
philosophers chose to make formal methods central to their work. Of
course, the decision to pursue this kind of work is, at least in part, a
matter of taste. However, in and beyond intellectual biography, these
responses provide some very illuminating and erudite examples of how
philosophers make - formal as well as informal - methodological
decisions.
Copenhagen and El Paso
December 2005
Acknowledgements
We
are indebted to Christopher M. Whalin for proof-reading the manuscript
and to our publisher Automatic Press ● VIP, in particular senior
publishing editor V.J. Menshy, for taking on this 'rather unusual
academic' project.
The 5 Questions
1. Why were you
initially drawn to formal methods?
2. What example(s) from
your work illustrates the role formal methods can play in philosophy?
3. What is the proper
role of philosophy in relation to other disciplines?
4. What do you consider
the most neglected topics and/or contributions in late 20th century
philosophy?
5. What are the most important open problems in
philosophy and what are the prospects for progress?
